Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal against conviction by a former police officer
12 January 2018
The Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal against conviction by a former police officer
who was found guilty of one count of intending to pervert the course of justice and
sentenced to six months imprisonment.
Background
Alfred David Beattie (“the appellant”) was a serving police officer. On 25 April 2015 he
drank a half bottle of wine and got into his car to drive to his girlfriend’s house.
Approximately a mile from his home he lost control of his vehicle and swerved into a tree.
He left the vehicle and walked home believing he did not need to report the accident to the
police as no other people or vehicles had been involved. After returning home he drank
more alcohol “to calm himself” and then decided to return to the vehicle to damage it with a
screwdriver to make it look as if it had been stolen. He stated that he was very drunk at this
stage.
Police officers called at his home the following day in connection with the recovery of the
vehicle. The appellant advised them that he had parked the car at the side of his house at
6.30 pm the previous evening and did not go out in it thereafter. He claimed not to own the
screwdriver found in the footwell of the driver’s seat. On 27 April, the appellant reflected on
what he had done and contacted his brother-in-law, who was also a police officer. He
accompanied the appellant to Lisburn Police Station where he was arrested and cautioned.
The appellant was transferred to Antrim Custody Suite where he was assessed by the
custody sergeant. He told the sergeant that he was frightened of where he stood now and
was noted to be upset, shaking and making noises indicative of crying. The custody
sergeant noted that on the journey to Antrim in the police car, the appellant had stated that
he had handed his firearm into police “to protect himself from himself” (the firearm had in
fact been handed over by his brother-in-law). The sergeant considered that the appellant
needed to be assessed for fitness for both detention and interview and pending that
assessment by the forensic medical officer (“FMO”) he directed that the appellant should be
subject to 15 minute checks. The FMO examined the appellant and considered he was fit for
detention and interview. He had no concerns that the appellant would cause any harm to
himself if he was released from custody as he had stated that he loved his parents too much
to do any harm to himself. The FMO also recorded that the appellant was to be released into
the care of relatives.
The issues in the appeal
The appellant objected at trial to the admission of his interview evidence. He claimed that he
should have been treated as a “mentally vulnerable” person under Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989 Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers (“Code C”). The trial judge conducted a voir dire,
hearing evidence from the arresting/interviewing officer, the FMO and Professor Farnan, a
FMO called on behalf of the appellant. Professor Farnan, who had never examined the
appellant, maintained that he was mentally vulnerable when he was being interviewed
noting his past history of depression, his appearance on booking into the police station and
his comment that he had given up his firearm. The FMO, however, had the advantage of
examining the appellant immediately prior to the interview and the appellant volunteered a
clear account of his background. He was satisfied that the appellant was not mentally
vulnerable. The arresting/interviewing officer gave evidence that the appellant was clearly
upset to find himself in that situation and that he had liaised with the custody sergeant. The
custody sergeant, whose responsibility it was to determine whether appellant was mentally
vulnerable, was not called as a witness.
The trial judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was not mentally
vulnerable at the time of the interview and there was no reason to exclude his interview
evidence.
Consideration
The case made by the appellant was that that the failure to provide an appropriate adult was
contrary to the requirements of Code C. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge had
no evidence from the custody sergeant and no statement had been taken from him. It
commented that it may be onerous to require retired officers to return to give evidence in all
cases in which there is some issue concerned with a custody record but that this was a case
in which the appellant had given notice through his defence statement of the basis upon
which he was going to challenge the admission of the interviews.
The Court said it would have been appropriate for the custody sergeant in this case to have
been called to give evidence as the issue was directly concerned with his determination of an
important protection under Code C. The Court, however, did not accept that in the absence
of the custody sergeant, the trial judge should have adopted an adverse inference about
whether he had a suspicion of mental vulnerability:
“The custody sergeant was careful in light, in particular, of the comments made
in the police vehicle on the way to Antrim Custody Suite. His decisions to
require assessment by the FMO and to order a 15 minute check on the appellant
were indicators of that care. It is clear, however, that [the FMO] was able to deal
with the concerns about the appellant’s vulnerability and the custody record
shows that he communicated this directly to the custody sergeant. The fact that
the [FMO] saw the appellant placed him at a considerable advantage. His
conclusion was supported by [the arresting/interviewing officer]. It was also
supported by the fact that the experienced solicitor attending the appellant did
not raise any issue about the need for an appropriate adult. We consider that the
drawing of an adverse inference in this case was not supported by that
evidence.” The Court of Appeal accepted that the trial judge’s conclusion that there was no breach of
Code C was unimpeachable and that his charge to the jury had been scrupulously fair. It
dismissed the appeal.
